Collective Bargaining by Public Employee Groups by Cornell, Herbert W.
19581
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BY
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE GROUPS
HFMBERT W. CORN-EL t
More and mwre public employees have been permitted to organize and bar-
gain collectively. But in- this Article, the author, former City Personnel
Director of the City of Milwaukee and civil service administrator on local,
state and federal levels, argues that ultimately the public worker must look
to political pressure and persuasio, not to formal agreements, as the means
of securing his ecaowmic rights.
Collective bargaining by organized labor is universally accepted in
the industrial world, but in the field of public employment its very
right to exist has been challenged, and it has been the subject of dis-
cordant and contradictory judicial decisions. However, its progress
has been marked, and it exists today in some form in more than two
hundred separate governmental subdivisions, although in most instances
the collective bargaining agreement covers only certain groups or classes
of employees, sometimes but a small fraction of the total number
employed.
Most often the governmental unit to enter into the agreement has
been a city, but such contracts have also been made by states, counties
and other political subdivisions. In the great majority of agreements the
employees have been represented by various locals of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO.
This organization has tabulated and classified existing agreements in
order of definiteness as follows:
Bilateral Agreements (Contractual) ................ 122
Ordinances .................................... 8
Resolutions .................................... 23
Rules (Civil Service or Departmental) .............. 20
Statement of Policy by Municipal Authorities ........ 29
THE ESSENTIALS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Collective bargaining has been judicially defined as involving
"an agreement between an employer and a labor union which
regulates the terms and conditions of employment with reference
t Member, Wisconsin Bar. Formerly Secretary of State Civil Service Com-
mission of Colorado, Examiner for the United States Civil Service Commission, City
Personnel Director, City of Milwaukee.
44 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107
to hours of labor, wages, and deals also with strikes, lockouts,
walkouts, arbitration, shop conditions, safety devices, the enforce-
ability and interpretation of such agreement and of numerous other
relations existing between employer and employee." 1
In an article in the Labor Law Journal,2 Joseph P. Goldberg advanced
the proposition that the collective bargaining process was made up of
four major structural elements:
(1) The right of workers to organize into unions of their own
choosing,
(2) Recognition of the exclusive right of a majority union to
represent all the workers in a plant,
(3) Negotiation between union and management on wages, work-
ing conditions and grievances, and
(4) Incorporation of the results of such negotiations in a written
contract.
Mr. Goldberg concluded that only as to paragraph (1), the right
to organize, did federal employees enjoy a position fully comparable to
that of their private counterparts. By the prevailing rule of the state
jurisdictions it would be equally true to say this of the employees of
states, counties and cities as well. Although here and there upheld, the
elements described in Mr. Goldberg's second, third and fourth categories
are outlawed in many states for state, county and city employees.
THE RIGHT To ORGANIZE
Even under paragraph (1) there are exceptions. There have been
many cases where public employees, or certain classes of public em-
ployees such as policemen, firemen and teachers, have been forbidden to
organize. Statutes, city ordinances, and in many instances mere
departmental rules prohibiting union membership have been upheld.
Thus, when the Supreme Court of Alabama had before it a case in
which a city council had adopted an ordinance forbidding members of
the police and fire departments to belong to any union and requiring a
pledge disclaiming membership, the prohibition was held to be within the
city's power, although the ordinance itself was defective, in that it
denied any right of hearing as was guaranteed by state law.3
1. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 873, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 605 (Sup.
Ct. 1943), rez/d onr other grounds, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
2. GOLDBERG, CONSTRUCmTVE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN GOVERNMENT, 8 LA. L.J.
551 (1957).
3. Hickman v. City of Mobile, 256 Ala. 141, 53 So. 2d 752 (1951).
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Later, the State of Alabama passed a law to the same effect, which
was resisted on the ground that the organization was a "discussion
group" and therefore not within the scope of the statute, but this claim
was rejected by the State supreme court.' The constitutionality of the
law itself was then attacked in a new action in the federal courts, relief
being denied on the ground that the remedy which might be had in the
state courts had not been exhausted.'
The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in upholding the discharge of
a police officer who had refused to resign from a labor union, said,
"This case does not involve in any way the merits or demerits
of labor unions when confined to private employment. In their
place, outside of governmental agencies, their merits are fully
conceded. It was as to their place when city policemen are in-
volved that the civil service commission was here concerned and
it is that only with which the court is concerned." 6
In this case there was no state statute or city ordinance involved,
merely a departmental rule.' Similarly the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
held that a police officer is not protected by the constitutional guarantees
of freedom of speech and of assembly, and may be dismissed for refusing
to resign from the Fraternal Order of Police.' In a California case it
was held that such a rule is not unreasonable or arbitrary.9 The fact
that police were involved may have influenced the court; however, the
same principle was followed three years later in California in the case
of a plumbing inspector. 10
The general tendency of the courts to uphold the restriction of
personal rights of public employees may be said to stem from the
famous and very extensively quoted words of Justice Holmes when he
was a member of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics,
but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman. There are
few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to
4. Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 262 Ala. 285,
78 So. 2d 646 (1955).
5. Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364
(1957), reversing 146 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Ala. 1956).
6. City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 676, 687, 24 So. 2d 319, 321, cert. denied,
328 U.S. 863 (1946).
7. Ibid.; see also Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S.E. 410 (1935); Fra-
ternal Order of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N.W2d 310 (1943).
8. Goodwin v. Oklahoma City, 199 Okla. 26, 182 P.2d 762 (1947).
9. Perez v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 78 Cal. App. 2d 638, 178 P.2d 537 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1947).
10. Young v. Board of Bldg. & Safety Comm'rs, 100 Cal. App. 2d 468, 224 P.2d
16 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950). In this case union membership was permitted, but a
resolution by an administrative board forbade any employee to be an officer in any
union affiliated with a national labor organization.
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suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as of idleness,
by the implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain,
as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered him.
On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable condi-
tion upon holding offices within its control." 11
This case has been a tower of strength to civil service reformers and
administrators in restricting political activity among public job-holders,
but its philosophy has been much challenged, especially in the political
science departments of universities. Here, more than in the courts,
there is a feeling that public servants should not be expected to surrender
rights which are taken for granted in the case of workers in industry.
However, it is still good law, and many of the cases which have upheld
restrictions on union memberships or activities depend directly or
indirectly upon it.
However, the right of organization for proper purposes in the
absence of any specific prohibition has generally been upheld, although
this does not carry with it the right to bargain collectively.'"
In eighteen states "right to work" laws have been enacted, with
the primary purpose of preventing discrimination because of race,
religion, or non-union status.'3 In some instances these laws have
been accompanied by companion statutes extending this to the public
service, while in other instances the right to work law itself applies to
public employees or has been interpreted to do so. In Texas, where
previous decisions had upheld ordinances and rules against union
membership,' 4 a similar ordinance was held invalid as being in conflict
with such a statute. 5
11. McAuliffe v. Mayor, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
12. Erie County Water Authority v. Kramer, 208 Misc. 292, 143 N.Y.S.2d 379
(Sup. Ct. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 4 App. Div. 2d 545, 167 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1957) ;
Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951), 31
A.L.R. 1133; Mugford v. Mayor, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945), 162 A.L.R. 1101;
City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947) ; Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Corsi, 239 N.Y. 315, 56 N.E.2d 721, aff'd, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
13. Florida (1944) ; Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska, North Caro-
lina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia (1947); Nevada
(1952); Alabama (1953) ; Mississippi and South Carolina (1954); Utah (1955)
Indiana (1957).
14. CID v. Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
15. Beverly v. Dallas, 292 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). The statute is a
companion to the Texas Right To Work Law and appears as art. 5154c of Vernon's
Revised Civil Statutes (1925). Section 1 reads as follows: "It is declared to be
against the public policy of the State of Texas for any official or group of officials
of the State, or of a County, City, Municipality or other political subdivision of the
State, to enter into a collective bargaining contract with a labor organization respect-
ing the wages, hours or conditions of employment of public employees, and any such
contracts entered into after the effective date of this Act shall be null and void."
(Sections 2, 3 and 4 forbid recognition of labor organization as bargaining agent,
forbid strikes, and forbid discrimination because of union status. Section 5 defines
the term labor organization.)
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COMPATIBILITY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WITH
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Until very recently the courts everywhere held to a very conserva-
tive view on the limitations on municipalities to make collective bar-
gaining contracts with labor organizations. While in some cases it
was allowed when the municipality was engaged in a proprietary
function, the more modern tendency has been to abandon this distinction
on the ground that it had its origin in the limitation of liability in tort
actions, and to recognize no distinction between proprietary and govern-
mental functions. 6 A Missouri case involving the interpretation of a
constitutional amendment which has been extensively quoted is City of
Springfield v. Clouse.17 In 1945 Missouri adopted a new constitution,
one section providing "that employees shall have the right to organize
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing." I Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment to determine the legal
power of the city to make collective bargaining contracts with labor
unions representing city employees concerning wages, hours, collection
of union dues and working conditions. The court rejected the claim
of the union officers that this authorized collective bargaining with
municipalities, and called attention to the fact that this constitutional
provision had been proposed by the president of the State federation of
labor, who at that time had said:
"I don't believe there is anyone in the organization that would
insist upon having a collective bargaining agreement with a munici-
pality setting forth wages, hours, and working conditions. That
would be absolutely impossible insofar as wages and hours are
concerned because the Common Council and the Mayor are the
last word and you cannot pay a salary or wage to a municipal
employee unless it is provided by law." "
He then contended that collective bargaining was applicable to other
matters, such as classifications, night work, day work, etc., but the
court declared that this was confusing collective bargaining with the
rights of petition, peaceable assembly and free speech. After upholding
the right of employees to organize for proper purposes, the court said:
"It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that the legis-
lature cannot delegate its legislative powers and any attempted
delegation thereof is void. [Citing cases.] If such powers cannot
16. City of Cleveland v. Division 268 Amalgamated Ass'n St. & Elec. Ry. Em-
ployees, 30 Ohio Op. 395, 90 N.E.2d 711 (C.P. 1949).
17. 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947).
18. Mo. CoixsT. art. 1, § 29.
19. 356 Mo. at 1247, 206 S.W.2d at $43.
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be delegated they surely cannot be bargained or contracted away;
and certainly not by any administrative or executive officers who
cannot have any legislative powers. Although executive and ad-
ministrative officers may be vested with a certain amount of discre-
tion and may be authorized to act or make regulations in accordance
with certain fixed standards, nevertheless the matter of making
such standards involves the exercise of legislative powers. Thus
qualifications, tenure, compensation and working conditions of
public officers and employees are wholly matters of lawmaking
and cannot be the subject of bargaining or contract. . . . There-
fore, this section can only be construed to apply to employees in
private industry where actual bargaining may be used from which
valid contracts concerning terms and conditions of work may be
made. It cannot apply to public employment where it could
amount to no more than giving expression to desires for the law-
maker's consideration and guidance. For these fundamental
reasons, our conclusion is that Section 29 [of the constitution]
cannot reasonably be construed as conferring any collective bar-
gaining rights upon public officers or employees in their relations
with state or municipal government." 20
The court, after setting forth a description of the civil service system,
further concludes that any collective bargaining agreements between the
city and a labor union would be an infringement on the statutory powers
of the city's civil service commission.21
Included in this case, and also quoted in several other of these cases,
is a letter written by Franklin D. Roosevelt, who certainly was not an
enemy of organized labor, to Luther Steward, president of a large
union of federal employees, in which President Roosevelt said:
"All government employees should realize that the process of
collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted
into the public service. It has its distinct and insurmountable
limitations when applied to public personnel management. The
very nature and purposes of government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in
mutual discussions with government employee organizations. The
employer is the whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted
by their representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative
officials and employees alike are governed and guided, and in many
instances restricted, by laws which establish policies, procedures,
or rules in personnel matters." '
In some states the legislature has specifically authorized collective
bargaining contracts between units of government and labor unions, but
20. Id. at 1251, 206 S.W2d at 545.
21. Id. at 1252, 206 S.W2d at 546.
22. Id. at 1247, 206 S.W.2d at 542.
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the tendency of the courts has been to limit narrowly the field of action
which is authorized. Thus, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma deter-
mined that employees of the Grand River Dam Authority were em-
ployees of the state, and, after quoting the statutory authorization for
collective bargaining, stated:
"The quoted section authorizes the Authority to exercise
the power of appointing employees and fixing their compensation.
It purports to authorize the Authority to enter into contracts with
labor unions, but it gives no power to any labor union or to the
employees of the Authority to determine who may work or the
compensation that shall be paid. Nor does it purport to sanction
the right of such employees to strike for any reason ... We
are of the opinion and hold that the power given the Authority to
enter into contracts with labor unions was discretionary and not
mandatory. . . . We hold that in the absence of any contract
with the Authority, the Union has no right to call a strike to coerce
the Authority into exercising a discretionary power. It is im-
material as to why the Authority refused to enter into the
contract." I
However, a labor relations law intended to secure rights to em-
ployees and to compel collective bargaining by their employers when
demanded has been held not to apply to public employees unless dis-
tinctly so stated, especially when the state or municipality has a per-
sonnel system which secures to public employees the rights and pro-
tection reasonably needed by them.'
RECOGNITION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN NEW YORK
The most outstanding example of a change in judicial thinking
with no change in constitution or statute is to be found in the State of
New York. In 1943 the Supreme Court of Albany County, using lan-
guage which could scarcely have been made more emphatic, declared in
Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy:2 5
"To tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service
employees of the government as a labor organization or union
is not only incompatible with the spirit of democracy, but incon-
sistent with every principle upon which our government is founded.
Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that
hired servants of the State can dictate to the government the
hours, the wages and conditions under which they will carry on
23. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Grand River Dam Authority, 292
P.2d 1018, 1021 (Okla. 1956).
24. Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1946).
25. 180 Misc. 868, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1943), re''d o; other gTrounds,326
U.S. 88 (1945).
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essential services vital to the welfare, safety and security of the
citizen.
"The reasons are obvious which forbid acceptance of any
such doctrine. Government is formed for the benefit of all persons,
and the duty of all to support it is equally clear. Nothing is more
certain than the indispensable necessity of government, and it is
equally true that unless the people surrender some of their natural
rights to the government it cannot operate. Much as we all
recognize the value and the necessity of collective bargaining in
industrial and social life, nonetheless, such bargaining is impossible
between the government and its employees, by reason of the very
nature of government itself..
"Collective bargaining has no place in government service.
The employer is the whole people. It is impossible for administra-
tive officials to bind the government of the United States or the
state of New York by any agreement made between them and rep-
resentatives of any union. Government officials and employees are
governed and guided by laws which must be obeyed and which
cannot be abrogated or set aside by any agreement of employees
and officials." '
The decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court 27
on a point that did not in any way affect the opinion of the court on
the subject of collective bargaining, and after the reversal it continued
to be quoted." Yet the courts of New York, though having it before
them, utterly disregarded it. The right of collective bargaining has
not only been recognized in later cases, but seems taken for granted.
Thus, in 1956, it was held that a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the New York City Transit Authority and a union which specifi-
cally reserved to the employees all their rights under the state civil rights
law and under the civil service law was not illegal, the court pointing
out the fact that there was no law on the statute books of New York
making it illegal per se for a public agency to negotiate a collective bar-
gaining agreement with a union.29 This case was reversed on other
grounds (involving the rights of rival unions)a0 but not with any
26. Id. at 875-76, 44 N.Y.S.2d at 607-08.
27. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
28. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94
Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949); Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951), 31 A.L.R.2d 1133.
29. Civil Serv. Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 3 Misc. 2d 346, 151
N.Y.S.2d 402 (Sup. Ct. 1956). For an account of the history of unionization among
the Transit Authority's employees, and the anomalous position occupied by the Civil
Service Forum as an organization and as bargaining agent, see SPERo, GOVERNMENT
AS EpLOYE (1948).
30. Civil Serv. Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 4 App. Div. 2d
117, 163 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1957), reversed the granting of the Authority's motion for
dismissal and granted instead a declaratory judgment in favor of the Authority's
position that the collectve bargaining agreement was valid.
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effect of modifying the right of collective bargaining. The court
agreed with the earlier holding that it was within the power of the
Transit Authority to make collective bargaining agreements with labor.
The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, and in the
briefs submitted the attention of the court was called to the language
used in the Railway Mail case condemning the right of public em-
ployees to bargain collectively. Attention was also called to the fact
that there had been no statutory or constitutional amendment which
would permit such a change in doctrine, and that at the New York
constitutional convention of 1938 a proposed amendment to the State
constitution which would have extended the right of collective bar-
gaining to public employees was rejected, and several bills which had
been introduced in the New York Legislature to the same effect had
failed of enactment. (One did pass both houses of the Legislature but
was vetoed by the Governor.) However, on April 3, 1958, the de-
cision was unanimously affirmed."1 No further opinion was written,
but two of the justices in concurring wrote the following memoran-
dum: "I concur for affirmance mainly by reason of the limited nature of
this contract combined with the history of unionization in this industry
while under private ownership and the presence in the contract of a
clause permitting it to be cancelled by the Authority at any time." 32
It would be difficult to find a more radical change in judicial
thinking in the short course of thirteen years. One of the attorneys
who worked on the case said that he could not explain the basis for the
change in the judicial attitude as enunciated in the Railway Mail case.
Perhaps the fact that public sympathy strongly favored the motormen
and other transit employees, combined with the fact that a decision
denying their right of collective bargaining might conceivably have
precipitated another strike may have entered into judicial thinking in
this case. Human elements of this kind cannot be kept out of discus-
sions of legal principles.
Probably in no other state has so radical a departure from the
earlier doctrine been made. Yet the tendency can here and there be
seen. However, it is probable that in most other states the earlier
doctrines will be followed and it does not seem likely that there will be a
general acceptance of collective bargaining without legislative authoriza-
tion or in some cases constitutional amendment. Probably lobbying
rather than litigation will be the field of conflict.
Many organizations of public employees, whether or not they bear
the title of unions, have clauses in their constitutions forbidding strikes
31. Civil Serv. Forum v. New York City Transit Authority, 4 N.Y.2d 866, 150
N.E.2d 705 (1958).
32. Id. at 868, 150 N.E.2d at 706.
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or work stoppages. This undoubtedly has influenced the thinking of
the courts in some cases. The real principle involved, however, is
independent of this factor and should be considered separately from it.
CHECK-OFF OF UNION DuEs
Withholding from wages of union dues, and remittance of the
money to the union, is often a feature of collective bargaining con-
tracts, and efforts have been made to carry this into contracts with
municipalities. In Baltimore a citizen brought a taxpayer's action to
have such an agreement declared void.33 It was held that if this should
be done at the demand of the union it would be illegal, but that there
was no objection to the municipality complying with the request of each
employee that such deductions be made and the money remitted to the
union. The court limited this in the following words:
"The city has no right under the law to delegate its governing
power to any agency. The power of the city is prescribed in its
charter, and the City Charter constitutes the measure of power
that is possessed by any of its officials. To delegate such power to
an independent agency would be a serious violation of the law.
To recognize such delegation of power in any city department
might lead to the delegation of such power in all departments,
and would result in the city government being administered re-
gardless of its charter." 34
The court also condemned the closed shop and held that a depart-
ment of the city could not bind the city by contract in regard to hours,
wages, working conditions, nor could the city authorities divest them-
selves of their discretionary powers in regard to labor policies.
A more restrictive view was taken by the Supreme Court of Ohio,
significantly, in the face of a city ordinance specifically authorizing
check-off of union dues. Upon challenge by the Director of Finance of
the City of Dayton, the ordinance was held invalid as being in conflict
with a general law of the State which prohibited assignment of wages
but made an exception in favor of agreements for dues check-offs. 5
The court held that a municipal corporation is not included in the
term "employers" nor civil service appointees in the term "employees"
as these terms are used in the law allowing such check-offs. The
court further said:
33. Mugford v. Mayor, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1945), 162 A.L.R. 1101.
34. Id. at 271, 44 A.2d at 747.
35. Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313, 71 N.E.2d 246 (1947), 170
A.L.R. 199.
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"There is no municipal purpose served by the check-off of
wages of civil service employees. Counsel for appellees argue
that a check-off is a convenience to both the municipal appointee
and the labor union. We must be realistic and take judicial
notice of what is generally known, that the check-off is a means of
maintaining membership. . . . The check-off is contrary to the
spirit and purpose of the civil service laws of the state.
"[L]abor unions have no function which they may dis-
charge in connection with civil service appointees.
. . . There is no authority for the delegation either by the
municipality or the civil service appointees of any functions to any
organization of any kind." "
It will be observed that the Supreme Court of Ohio went far
beyond the question which was before it, namely, the legality of dues
check-off, and while not denying the right of public employees to
unionize, did deny virtually all the advantages and gains of collective
bargaining. It is easy to challenge some of the statements of the court
as being prejudiced and false, but the fact remains that the case is a
valuable one for the point of view which it presents.
This declaration of the illegality of dues check-off, even when
authorized by ordinance, has been received with approval, both
judicially and by the prevailing thought of political scientists. Yet it is
a fact that the arrangement is coming more and more into use, and
today exists in a considerable number of cities including even some in
Ohio. The idea of union leaders appears to be that if they can make
it operate as a practical arrangement they need not worry about un-
favorable judicial decisions; future changes in our governmental struc-
ture will, they believe, take care of that factor.
THE IMPACT OF "RIGHT To WORK" LAWS
Since 1944, "right to work" laws have been enacted in eighteen
states . 7 Although passed primarily to protect workers in industry re-
gardless of union membership or non-membership, they have been
recognized by the courts as affecting the problems of public employ-
ment. In some states the "right to work" law would not by its own
terms apply to the public service but a companion statute would do so.
Thus, in Texas, a city ordinance prohibiting the formation of
unions among city employees was, in 1956, declared to be invalid as
36. Id. at 328-29, 71 N.E2d at 253-54.
37. States are listed at note 13 supra.
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being in conflict with such a law passed in 1947,3" although in 1946 a
similar prohibitory ordinance had been upheld."9 In Florida the right
of collective bargaining by a union with a city was denied, notwith-
standing a provision in the "right to work" statute that it "shall not be
construed to deny or abridge the right of employees by or through a
labor organization or union to bargain collectively with their em-
ployer." 4 The court took the view that the "employer" in this con-
notation did not include municipal corporations.
It is impossible to tell at this time whether the trend toward
the enactment of "right to work" laws will continue, and if so whether
they are likely by their own terms to apply to the public service. If
there is no such specific designation, it appears probable that the
judicial tendency will restrict such coverage, especially when there is a
civil service system giving an adequate degree of protection to such
employees.4 '
THE STRIKE PROBLEM
Strikes by public employees have been prohibited by law in many
states and such laws have been universally upheld, although a very
few exceptions to their applicability to specific situations can be found.
Thus, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the employees of an
agricultural improvement and power district were not public em-
ployees and that strikes would be legal. Such districts had been au-
thorized by state law, with the powers of a municipal corporation,
and, by an amendment to the state constitution, were declared to be
political subdivisions of the State. They were voluntary organizations,
however, since any five landowners could organize such a district, and
could store and distribute irrigation water and could sell electricity to
the public. It was held that although the powers and functions of a
municipal corporation are present, the agricultural improvement and
power district is a business enterprise the functions of which are eco-
nomic rather than governmental. In this case a collective bargaining
agreement had been made relating to wages, hours, and working condi-
tions. When this agreement expired the district refused to renew it and
the union called a strike to compel such action. Since the court upheld
the union's contention, this case has been much relied upon by union
attorneys as confirming the right to strike when a constitutionally
38. Beverly v. Dallas, 292 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). See text of
applicable section of the Texas statute at note 15 supra.
39. CIO v. Dallas, 198 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
40. Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d
194 (1946), 165 A.L.R. 967.
41. Nutter v. City of Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1946).
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declared "political subdivision of the state" is involved, but the court
felt justified in disregarding the label and considering the actual nature
of the employer.'
Even with the existence of laws outlawing strikes, the tendency of
the courts seems to be to regard them as simply announcing the court's
authority, not extending it. Thus where the New York Transit Au-
thority sued to restrain a strike by unionized motormen the court
granted relief which it based primarily on a statute prohibiting strikes
by public employees but also declared the court's power, in the ab-
sence of any statute, "to enjoin a strike which would wreck so essential
a governmental service as that which is represented by this city's
rapid transit facilities." I In this case the union laid heavy emphasis
on the claim that the city was acting in a proprietary, not governmental,
capacity, but the court took the view that this distinction had become
outworn, and that modern metropolitan conditions demanded that trans-
portation be classed as a governmental function. Particularly, the
court observed, "[T]his is not the nineteenth century and the city of
New York is not a horse and buggy town." "
Strikes in the public service may have only an incidental connection
with the question of collective bargaining, but since many of the court
cases dealing with collective bargaining have involved strikes, the de-
cisions regarding collective bargaining reflect such situations. There
is no question of the seriousness of the problem, but it should be noted
that David Ziskind's book, One Thousand Strikes of Government
Employees, has had the effect of greatly exaggerating the evil, since
most of his so-called strikes were brief interruptions of work among
WPA and other relief workers, the commonest cause being nothing
more serious than delay in receiving their pay checks. In 1947 the
United States Supreme Court assumed that public employees may
not strike against the Government, the question being whether the
mine workers had become Government employees when the Govern-
ment took over the coal mines, and whether the anti-injunction pro-
visions of the Norris-La Guardia Act would apply to them.45
Two very recent cases in Tennessee are deserving of careful study.
Weakley County owns and operates a municipal electric system and
42. Local 266, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Salt River Project Agri-
cultural Improvement & Power Dist., 78 Ariz. 30, 275 P.2d 393 (1954).
43. New York Transit Authority v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209
(Sup. Ct), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1956).
44. Id. at 737, 154 N.Y.S.2d at 214.
45. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). Compare
Board of Educ. v. Public School Employees Union, 45 N.W.2d 797 (Minn. 1951),
involving the applicability of Minnesota's "Little Norris-La Guardia Act." See also
City of Manchester v. Manchester Teachers Guild, 100 N.H. 507, 131 A.2d 59 (1957),
holding that a statute authorizing collective bargaining with unions does not make
strikes any the less unlawful.
56 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107
sought an injunction against picketing by a union which had called
a strike, not for higher pay, but to compel recognition and the signing
of a collective bargaining contract.4" Picketing had been peaceful, but
was held by the nisi prius court to be illegal and the strike to be for an
illegal purpose. The court of appeals recognized the distinction be-
tween proprietary and governmental functions but held, nevertheless,
that the county could not lawfully enter into a collective bargaining
agreement with its employees as a labor union and granted injunctive
relief.
The other Tennessee case, involving the electrical system of
the City of Alcoa was very similar, there being a strike to compel
recognition of the union as the bargaining agent of the employees and
to compel the execution of a collective bargaining agreement. The
court held that this would amount to coercing the delegation of dis-
cretion which a public board or body must exercise in the fulfillment of
its duties.47
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION REPORT
On June 27, 1955, the American Bar Association's Committee on
Labor Relations of Government Employees rendered a report which
was published in the 1955 Proceedings of the ABA Section of Labor
Relations Law. It quotes no court cases and does not assume to be
setting forth any existing judicial doctrines. It does, however, recog-
nize the fact that public authorities have all too often pursued socially
indefensible policies and then have looked to the judiciary to solve
problems which need never have arisen, and that such situations are
not satisfactorily settled by insisting on the old doctrine that collective
bargaining either may not exist in the public service or must be held
down to the level of petition, or, at most, negotiation regarding minor
matters. The Report is lengthy, but the following excerpt will give a
sufficient idea of its purport.
"Government as employer has failed in many instances to
practice what it compels industry to do. Legislatures which deny
to government agencies the use of some proper form of collective
bargaining procedures so familiar in industry (at least in terms of
'collective negotiation'), which attempt to restrict unduly the
right of employees to organize and to petition the government for
redress of their grievances, need to review the problem more
realistically.
"It is a fallacy to assume that the usual so-called 'Merit-
system' laws governing the civil services are so comprehensive
46. Wealdey County Municipal Elec. Sys. v. Vick, 309 S.W.Zd 792 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1957), cert. denied, 309 S.W.2d 792 (Tenn. 1958).
47. City of Alcoa v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 308 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn.
1957).
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that employees have no proper basis for complaint as to their
working conditions, or that their grievances are all superficial.
Most of such laws relate primarily, if not exclusively, to the manner
of appointment, promotion, discharge and change in status. Oc-
casionally they regulate classification of positions based on duties
and responsibilities, as well as establish a basis for salary plans.
Laws governing employee relationships are usually less flexible in
the public service than is generally the rule in private employment.
"Government which denies to its employees the right to
strike against the people, no matter how just might be the griev-
ances, owes to its public servants an obligation to provide working
conditions and standards of management-employee relationships
which would make unnecessary and unwarranted any need for
such employees to resort to stoppage of public business. It is too
idealistic to depend solely on a hoped-for beneficent attitude of
public administrators. Promises of well-meaning public officials
imbued with a sense of high authority who resort to the pretense
of alleged limitations on their powers to avoid dealing forth-
rightly with representatives of their subordinate employees only
aggravate grievances. Some practical machinery for handling
grievances, fancied or real, needs to be provided to insure to em-
ployees that public management is concerned with their just com-
plaints.
"Every public jurisdiction should carefully review its laws
pertaining to the conditions of service of public employees to be
sure they meet present day concepts of sound employee relation-
ships."
Few if any experienced public personnel administrators will find
this American Bar Association Committee Report acceptable in its
entirety. Many would probably condemn it as leading to appease-
ment in an area where strong action, not appeasement, is needed. Cer-
tain it is that laws forbidding strikes in the public service should not
be repealed or weakened, and judicial precedents which give protection
to the public should not be ignored. Strikes in the public service are
far more serious and harmful than strikes in industry. Illegal strikes
will not be made innocuous by making them legal, any more than people
will be made virtuous by repealing the Ten Commandments. Yet
there is much of value to the administrator in the Report. There is
undoubtedly a field of action in which public officials can solve their
labor problems before they lead to deplorable situations and can make
many court actions unnecessary.
THE PHILADELPHIA CONTRACT
The collective bargaining agreement of February 20, 1958, be-
tween the City of Philadelphia and the American Federation of State,
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County and Municipal Employees, is pointed to as a model which the
unions would like to see in effect in all cities. It is by far the most
extensive in its coverage, embracing departments with a total employee
enrollment of over 18,000, of whom more than 11,000 are actually
union members. It applies to all city employees except firemen,
policemen, professional men, executives above the grade of foremen,
and teachers. Its terms include union recognition as the sole bar-
gaining agent, access of union officers not only to employee records but
also to workshops and other places of employment during working
hours, wage rates, overtime rates and determination of what con-
stitutes overtime, holiday pay, vacations, seniority rights, sick leave
and other fringe benefits, grievance procedure, and dues check-off.
Such extensive applicability would apparently remove much discretion
from department heads in directing their subordinates. There is, how-
ever, a definite prohibition against strikes and work stoppages.
Thi contract supersedes a collective bargaining agreement of
January 1, 1953. This agreement received the attention of the State
supreme court when certain employees sought to establish rights, al-
though they were in a department not covered by its provisions. Their
claim was disallowed on the ground that they were not parties to the
contract; the court did not go into the validity of the contract itself.4"
Because of its importance and extensive coverage, and because of the
evident intention of union leaders to have it used as a model to be
followed in other jurisdictions, its text is here set forth in full.
Agreement
This Agreement made and entered into on the 20th day of February 1958, by
and between the Personnel Director of the City of Philadelphia, hereinafter referred
to as the "Director" and District Council 33 of the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Philadelphia and Vicinity, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union".
It is agreed between the parties as follows:
Witnesseth:
W=EAs, It is the desire of both the parties to this Agreement to avoid indus-
trial disputes, and to bargain collectively with regard to wages, hours and working
conditions in the City, and in further consideration of the covenants and agreements
made by each of the parties as hereinafter set forth, the parties mutually agree to be
legally bound hereby and stipulate as follows: It being specifically understood and
agreed that all the provisions herein are subject to Civil Service Commission regula-
tions, the Home Rule Charter and other statutes, and if any provision is held or
found to conflict with the law or regulations relating thereto said provision shall
not bind either of the parties hereto.
Recognition of the Union
1.(a) The Director agrees to recognize the Union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent for the purpose of collective bargaining in any and all matters
relating to wages, hours and working conditions on behalf of all civil service employees
48. O'Donnell v. City of Philadelphia, 385 Pa. 189, 122 A.2d 690 (1956).
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
of the City of Philadelphia, with the exception of professional employees and super-visors above the level of foreman or its equivalent, and the uniformed and inves-tigatory personnel in the Police Department, Fire Department, Fairmount Park Com-
mission and the District Attorney's Office.
(b) It is understood, further, that the right of an employee or employees topresent his, her or their own requests or to adjust his, her or their own grievances,shall not be limited or impaired, and there shall be no discrimination between Unionand non-Union employees, nor shall there be more or less favorable treatment given
to any employee covered by this contract.
(c) Should questions arise warranting it, the specific definition of "professionalemployees and supervisors above the level of foreman or its equivalent" as mentionedin paragraph (a) above shall, at the request of either party, be the subject of inves-tigation and discussion by a joint committee to be appointed by the two parties,which will report back to the parties within two months from the date of the requestfor the appointment of the committee. Since the Union is precluded from repre-senting professional employees and supervisors above the level of foreman or itsequivalent for purposes of collective bargaining in any and all matters of wages,hours, and working conditions, it is agreed and understood that professional employeesand supervisors above the level of foreman or its equivalent will not be recognizedfor purposes of collective bargaining in any and all matters of wages, hours, andworking conditions, either as a separate group or as members of any organization
other than the Union.
(d) The appropriate local Union of District Council 33 shall have personsdesignated as Delegates in the unit within the jurisdiction of the particular localUnion. The Delegates so designated, in addition to the duly authorized officersand business agent of the local Union, will be recognized as the representative of the
local Union.
(e) The Director agrees to provide the Union regular access to all publicrecords indicating new appointments of employees within the bargaining unit, as
defined under paragraph 1.(a) above.
2. The Director does further agree to recognize any authorized Union officialand to permit the said official to visit the plant or workshops of the respective depart-ments of the employer and to investigate working conditions in the said plant at allreasonable hours and also for the purpose of adjusting disputes between the employerand the employees or any other matters relating to the terms and conditions of
this contract.
Hours of Work and Overtime Pay
1. Non-Shift Employees
The regular work week shall consist of forty hours, five conesecutive days,eight hours each, Monday to Friday inclusive. For purposes of conversion of annualsalary into daily rates, the annual salary shall be divide6 >y the total number of days
in the year, less Saturdays and Sundays.
(a) Any work performed by an employee after completing eight hours of workin any work day at regular rates shall be overtime. The employee shall be paid one
and one-half times his regular rate of pay.
(b) Any work performed by an employee on the 6th day worked of thework week shall be considered overtime. The employee shall be paid one and one-half
times his regular rate of pay.
(c) Any work performed by an employee on the 7th day of the work weekshall be considered overtime. The employee shall be paid two times his regular
rate of pay.
2. Shift Employees
Employees engaged in shift operations are defined as being any employee orgroup of employees engaged in an operation for which there is regularly scheduledemployment on Saturdays or Sundays, in which employment said employees par-
ticipate on a fixed or rotating basis.
The shift employee work week shall consist of forty hours, five days, eight hours
each, Monday to Sunday inclusive.
For purposes of conversion of annual salary into daily rates, the annual salaryshall be divided by the total number of days in the year, less Saturdays and Sundays.
(a) Any work performed by an employee after completing eight hours ofwork in any work shift at his regular rate of pay shall be considered overtime. Theemployee shall be paid one and one-half times his regular rate of pay.
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(b) Any work performed by an employee on his or her first regularly
scheduled day off, shall be overtime. The employee shall be paid one and one-half
times his regular rate of pay.
(c) Any work performed by an employee on his or her second regularly
scheduled day off, shall be considered overtime. The employee shall be paid two
times his regular rate of pay.
3. It is specifically understood that an employee in order to be eligible for
overtime compensation (in accordance with Paragraphs 1 and 2 above) during any
work week after the completion of five days in that particular week, must complete
a minimum of five days of work in that week, unless his absence from work on any
day of the week arises under the following circumstances: That absence was due
to a call from his Draft Board or a pre-induction physical examination, evidence of
which must be submitted; to a holiday recognized in this agreement which comes
within the week and on which no work is done; to an employee having been granted
leave of absence because of a death in the family, in accordance with Paragraph No. 3,
of section entitled "Sick Leave-Excusable Absence"; or to legitimate illness or an
accident suffered while at work preventing him from working before the completion
of five days in that particular week and for which proof must be submitted to the
satisfaction of such employee's superior.
4. Premium pay shall not be pyramided.
5. Overtime shall not be mandatory except in the case of situations affecting public
health or safety.
6. It is understood that the aforementioned provisions regarding overtime for the
sixth day shall not apply in the case of office and clerical employees regularly or
normally scheduled to work less than 37% hours in the first five days of the work
week; this shall not affect their rights to overtime after forty hours.
7. A full-time employee requested to work on his day off and reporting for work
on such day shall receive a minimum of four hours' pay for the day, at the appro-
priate rate for the day.
8. A full-time employee who has completed his full scheduled day, and who is
called back the same day and reports for work on such call-back, shall receive a
minimum of four hours' pay for the call-back, at the appropriate rate for the day,
subject to interruption for meals.
9. It is understood that the provisions of this section shall not apply in the case
of supervisors where Civil Service Commission regulations for such supervisors
provide otherwise.
Holiday Pay
1. All employees shall receive a regular day's pay for the following holidays,
even though not worked: New Year's Day, Lincoln's Birthday, Washington's Birthday,
Good Friday, Memorial Day, Flag Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus
Day, General Election Day, Veterans' Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day,
provided the employees have worked on their last scheduled work day immediately
preceding the holiday and on their next scheduled work day immediately after the
holiday, unless an employee's absence on these days is an excused absence with pay
within the terms of this contract; and provided further that where any of the above
holidays fall on a Saturday, they shall, in the case of non-shift employees, be observed
by granting the employees a compensatory day off with pay.
2. An employee required to work on any of the above enumerated holidays shall,
in addition to holiday pay, receive at least eight hours' pay for the holiday work,
and double time for all hours worked over eight hours.
3. A shift employee required to work on a scheduled day off which is a holiday
or a non-shift employee required to work on a Saturday which is a holiday shall be
compensated as follows: He shall receive pay for the day in accordance with the
section entitled Hours of Work and Overtime Pay of this agreement and in addition
shall be granted a compensatory day off with pay.
Wages
1. The parties hereto agree that the wages paid to the employees in the re-
spective departments, boards and commissions, of the City of Philadelphia shall be
in accordance with the Pay Plan as adopted by the Civil Service Commission and
the Administrative Board of the City of Philadelphia.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
2. It is agreed that the Union may present its request on the issue of wages to
the Personnel Director, the Civil Service Commission and the Administrative Board
prior to the adoption of the Budget Ordinance for any year. The Personnel Director,
the Civil Service Commission and the Administrative Board shall arrange meetings
with the Union in order to discuss the issue of wages. In order to provide for matured
discussion of the request of the Union, such meetings shall be arranged to commence
at least 180 days prior to the end of each year.
Vacations
1. All employees with less than one year's employment with the City shall receive
five-sixths of one day's vacation with pay for each month of service, such earned
vacation to be available to the employee, at the completion of his first six months
of service, or later; all employees with one or more year's employment and less than
ten years' employment with the City shall receive two weeks' vacation with pay;
all employees with ten or more years' employment with the City shall receive three
weeks' vacation with pay: Provided, that in the event that one of the enumerated
holidays above set forth falls within the vacation period, the employee shall receive
the pay for the holiday in addition to such employee's vacation grant, or may in the
employee's discretion be charged with one day less of vacation leave.
2. The above vacation or annual leave will be earned at the rate of five-sixths of
a day for each calendar month of service until the completion of nine years of con-
tinuous service, and at the rate of one and a quarter days for each calendar month
of service over nine years of continuous service. All unused vacation leave shall be
accumulated up to a maximum of thirty days.
Seniority
1. An employee serving as a full-time officer or employee of the Union, or of any
of the local unions, shall upon written application be granted a leave of absence
without pay for the period of such service. The seniority rights of such employee
shall be protected and they shall accumulate during such employee's period of service
with the Union.
2. In the case of layoffs, seniority of employees in the City service shall be
recognized as a factor to be given substantial weight, together with other factors,
in determining the order of layoff. When a layoff is contemplated, an opportunity
for discussion shall be afforded to the appropriate Union representatives prior to the
issuance of the notices of layoff.
3. Provisions as hereinabove set forth, as well as all other provisions of this
Agreement, shall not be contrary to Civil Service Regulations, the Home Rule
Charter or other statutes. In the event that any provision is found to be contrary
to Civil Service Regulations, the Home Rule Charter or other statutes, then such
provision shall be considered void and of no effect: Provided, however, that all other
valid provisions shall remain in full force and effect.
Sick Leave-Excusable Absence-Maternity Leave
1. Any employee contracting or incurring non-service connected sickness or dis-
ability, which renders such employee unable to perform the duties of his employ-
ment, shall receive sick leave with pay while unable to work as follows: Sick Leave
shall be earned on a monthly basis of 16 days per month, such earned sick leave to be
available to an employee at the completion of his first three months of service. For
an employee with one year or more of continuous service, as of January 1, 1954 a
credit of twenty days of earned sick leave shall be made available as of January 1,
1954 and from July 1, 1954 onwards the employee shall earn additional sick leave
at the aforementioned rate of 1% days per month
4 9 Where an employee does not
use the full sick leave herein authorized, such sick leave shall be accumulated in
full and shall be added to past accumulated sick leave, provided that such total
accumulation of sick leave shall not exceed 200 days.
2. Where the employee's absence is due to sickness or other disability which is
service-connected and which arises directly from the service of such employee, he
shall be paid as follows: Full pay up to a maximum period of twelve months from
the date of injury or sickness, during which time the absence shall not be charged
49. The contract of 1958 is in part a revision of the one of 1953 which was much
less comprehensive in its scope. Dates going back to 1954 are carried over from
the earlier contract.
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against sick or vacation leave and during which time sick leave and vacation leave
shall continue to be earned; if the employee is unable to return to City employment
at the end of twelve months, he shall then go on sick leave and vacation leave until
his accumulated sick and annual leave have been exhausted; if he is unable to return
to City employment by the time his sick and annual leave have been exhausted, he
shall continue to be paid until he is able to return or until the expiration of twenty-
four months from the date of service-connected injury or illness whichever period is
the shorter; no annual or sick leave shall be earned after the first twelve months
from the date of injury or illness.
3. In the event that there is a death in the immediate family of any employee,
consisting only of spouse, parents, children, brother, or sister, such employee shall
be granted a three days' leave of absence with full pay. An employee shall be granted
one day's absence with pay in the event of a death in the family of such employee
other than hereinbefore set forth.
4. Any employee who shall be absent from work by reason of sickness or other
disability or by reason of death in his family shall submit such evidence thereof as
may be required by such employee's superior.
5. The Director agrees to submit to the Civil Service Commission at the
earliest possible date a proposed regulation establishing a uniform policy of non-paid
maternity leave, following full consultation with the Union regarding the details
of such a policy.
Health and Welfare
1. Beginning January 1, 1957, the existing City contribution for medical-hospitali-
zation-surgical purposes shall be increased to $90.00 per annum per employee, to be
paid to established plans. In the case of the members of District Council 33, AFL-
CIO, the Director accepts the designation by the Union of the American Federation
of Labor Health Center, Philadelphia, as the medical-hospitalization-surgical program
for which the $90.00 per annum will be paid.
2. Beginning January 1, 1957, group term life insurance coverage in the amount
of $2,500 with accidental death and dismemberment benefits, shall be made available
for all full-time civil service employees (including District Council 33 members not
previously covered), pursuant to the terms of Civil Service Regulation 27.
Discharge-Suspension
1. In matters of discharge and suspension, all regulations of the Civil Service
Commission, provisions of the Home Rule Charter and all other applicable laws
shall be followed.
2. Any discharge or suspension may be considered by the Union or the individual
affected as a grievance to be discussed for possible adjustment under the "Grievance
Procedure", and in accordance with law.
Grievance Procedure
1. There shall be prior notice to the Union regarding changes in, or institution
of rules and regulations pertaining to working conditions, and opportunity for dis-
cussion of same wherever possible.
2. The City agrees to receive and consider any specific complaints from the Union
regarding alleged abuses under Civil Service Regulation 5.11, entitled "Temporary
Change in Assignment", and will sincerely attempt to correct such abuses where the
complaint is found to be justified.
3. In the event that any difference concerning the interpretation or application
of the Agreement shall arise, the procedure to be followed in an effort to reach a
mutual understanding shall be in the order as herein indicated:
(a) The question shall be discussed between the business agent of the local
union and the Personnel Officer, or authorized representative of the particular De-
partment, Board or Commission; and upon failure to agree
(b) Between the business agent of the local union and the head of the par-
ticular Department, Board or Commission; and upon failure to agree
(c) Between the business agent of the local union and the Personnel Director
of the City of Philadelphia.
In the event that the above steps fail to resolve the difference, it shall then be
submitted to an Advisory Board consisting of three members appointed or named
by the Personnel Director and three members appointed or named by the Union.
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The Advisory Board, consisting of six members, shall endeavor to settle the issue.
The Advisory Board shall not sit as a Board of Arbitration but shall serve in a
mediating capacity for the purpose of endeavoring to have the Personnel Director
and the Union mutually agree on the issue under discussion.
If a majority of this Board fails to agree, then its members shall select a seventh
member, who shall act in the capacity of Chairman of the Board. A quorum shall
consist of the full Board. A majority vote of this Board shall be required to decide
the difference or question, and such decision shall be considered as advisory only.
Joint Investigating Committee
In the interest of sound industrial relations, a joint committee of six, three from
each side, will convene from time to time and at the request of either party for the
purpose of investigating and resolving questions which may arise concerning condi-
tions of employment or grievances.
Dues Deductions
It is agreed that dues will continue to be deducted on the basis of written
authorizations.
Strikes and Lockouts
There shall be no strikes, lockouts or stoppages of work.
Termination, Change or Amendment
This agreement, representing an amendment of the agreement of January 1,
1953 as thereafter amended from year to year, shall be effective as of the first day
of January, 1958, and shall continue in full force and effect until December 31, 1958,
and thereafter from year to year, unless either party to this agreement gives sixty
days' written notice prior to December 31, 1958, or any yearly anniversary date
thereafter, to terminate this agreement, or extension thereof: Provided, however,
that either party may, by written notice, reopen and negotiate the issue of wages
at least one hundred and eighty days prior to the end of each year.
In Witness Whereof, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands and seals
the day and year aforesaid.
THE PROSPECTS FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
From the standpoint of union leadership, the fight to compel
governmental collective bargaining has been a losing one when com-
pared to the corresponding struggle in the industrial world. Labor
union attorneys have expressed the thought that many of the instances
in which governmental collective bargaining has been judicially de-
nounced have involved strikes vitally affecting public safety, and that
the zeal of the judiciary to protect the public interest has caused these
decisions to be based on the seriousness of the immediately threatened
situation rather than on the merits of collective bargaining in the
governmental area. It is true that few of the recorded cases have had as
the main subject before them the merits of governmental collective
bargaining in theory. This element has usually been a secondary con-
sideration, and judicial pronouncements thereon have often been
somewhat in the nature of dicta.
It is indeed quite possible that if public employee organizations
continue to acquire, through petition or political pressure, the advantage
of formal collective bargaining contracts, the judiciary may change its
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attitude, though perhaps not as rapidly as was done in New York.
Probably no serious attempt will be made to get the courts to recognize
the legality of strikes by public employees, especially since employee
groups can effectively make their will felt through political pressure on
elected municipal officials. Rather, efforts will more likely be directed
toward gaining court protection of employees who have been on strike
from punishments such as loss of seniority or other fringe benefits.
As far as organizations of public employees are concerned it is
probable that they will increase in number and influence, but it is
doubtful that the number of signed contracts will greatly increase.
More likely the objectives of these organizations will be secured by
declarations of policy by municipal officials, by rules of administrative
bodies, and by ordinances and resolutions of city councils, initiated by
persuasion and lobbying of employee groups. In the leadership of the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, which
is highly intelligent and, it is fair to say, civic-minded, there is a
realization that an understanding as to policy may accomplish more for
public employees than can be had by a bitter struggle for a formal
collective bargaining contract.
